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Abstract
In this paper, we put forward a new account of emergence called
“transformational emergence”. Such an account captures a variety of
emergence that can be considered as being diachronic and weakly onto-
logical. The fact that transformational emergence actually constitutes
a genuine form of emergence is motivated. Besides, the account is free
of traditional problems surrounding more usual, synchronic versions
of emergence, and it can find a strong empirical support in a specific
physical phenomenon, the fractional quantum Hall effect, which has
long been touted as a paradigmatic case of emergence.
1 Introduction
Current discussions about emergence have reached a stalemate. Either they
revolve around crafting metaphysically-loaded versions of the notion that
fail to have direct scientific relevance or empirical support, or they verge
on devising science-friendly versions that are metaphysically shallow. This
paper is about breaking this deadlock, by putting forward a new account of
the concept, called “transformational emergence” (hereafter [te]).
In section 2, we first propose an analysis of emergence in the light of
which we localize [te] in the conceptual landscape of the possible varieties
of the notion. On this basis, and after having given reasons why we believe
[te] is a variety of emergence in its own right (subsection 3.1), we turn to
providing a metaphysical account of it (subsection 3.2), which we opera-
tionalize to allow for empirically exemplifying it (subsection 3.3). We then
1
compare [te] to its main competing accounts on the current philosophical
market (subsection 3.4), and highlight the ways in which it solves or avoids
most of the traditional, vexing issues that the more widespread way of look-
ing at emergence unavoidably faces (subsection 3.5). Finally, in section 4,
we show that the account has strong empirical support.
2 Varieties of emergence
2.1 The hallmark of emergence
Emergence is an empirical relation between two relata, namely an emergent
E and its emergence basis B, such that the two following theses simultane-
ously obtain:
• (dep) E is dependent on, or determined by, B; and yet
• (nov) E is novel with regard to, or autonomous from, B.
While a given emergent and its corresponding basis have to be of a same
nature (e.g. E and B can be events, properties, laws, etc.), their common
nature may vary depending on the underlying ontological framework one
chooses to adopt or the philosophical task one seeks to accomplish.
From a temporal perspective, (dep) and (nov) can be construed in two
different ways. In the case of (dep), the determinative relation going from
B to E can be considered as being either synchronic – it can be, say, consti-
tution –, in which case E and B are individuated differently in terms of the
“levels” to which they respectively belong (E will usually be said to belong
to a “higher-level” than its “underlying”, simultaneous basis B). Or, the
determinative relation going from B to E can be diachronic – for instance,
it can be causation –, in which case E can (but doesn’t need to) belong
to the “same level” as its antecedent basis B (for E and B can be dis-
tinctly individuated by appealing to the different times of their occurrence).
Analogously, when it comes to (nov), one can consider E as being either
hierarchically novel with regard to its underlying and simultaneous basis B,
or historically novel with regard to its antecedent basis B, insofar as, for
example, E exhibits in both cases features that B simply doesn’t have.
Adopting the conventional notation that X lt denotes an entity X – what-
ever its exact nature – at time t and belonging to “level” l, one can devise
the concepts of synchronic and diachronic emergence on the following model:
El
′
t synchronically emerges on B
l
t (with l
′ > l) iff:
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(deps) B
l
t synchronically determines (e.g. constitutes) E
l′
t ; and yet
(novs) E
l′
t is hierarchically novel with regard to B
l
t.
El
′
t′ diachronically emerges on B
l
t (with t
′ > t and l′ ≥ l) iff:
(depd) B
l
t diachronically determines (e.g. causes) E
l′
t′ ; and yet
(novd) E
l′
t′ is historically novel with regard to B
l
t.
As they have been expressed, (dep) and (nov) are, both in their syn-
chronic and diachronic declinations, (i) obviously ambiguous and (ii) prima
facie in tension, for it can require some intricate speculation to convince
that a given entity E is at the same time dependent on, and novel with
regard to, a corresponding basis B. It is then not surprising that a great
deal of the emergentists’ energy turns out to be spent on finding (i) precise
ways of capturing or fleshing out (dep) and (nov) and (ii) ways of holding
them together in a non-contradictory fashion.
2.2 The conceptual landscape of emergence
There actually exist numerous approaches that have been put forward in
order to make sense of, and consistently reconcile, (deps) and (novs) or
(depd) and (novd). The landscape of the possible accounts of emergence
is thus today quite rich and complex. Accordingly, it can prove useful to
compartmentalize it with the help of the following two distinctions:
Epistemological vs. ontological emergence. Whereas it is usually the case
that (dep) is to be taken in an ontological sense, for it refers to a deter-
minative relation – e.g. constitution or causation – that is supposed to be
“out there” in the natural world, (nov) can be construed either epistemo-
logically or ontologically, depending on whether the autonomy or novelty
in question is to be found in our representations of the natural world or in
the natural world itself. Examples of the former kind of novelty, associated
with the so-called “epistemological” version of emergence, are reductive un-
explainability, unpredictability, non-derivability of laws, the impossibility to
describe in a lower-level vocabulary, etc. By contrast, cases of ontological
emergence usually go along with the advent of new, irreducible laws, powers
or properties.
Weak vs. strong emergence. As its name suggests, this distinction allows
for the possibility of a contrast between different degrees of a given type
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(e.g. epistemological or ontological) of emergence.1 When it comes to forms
of epistemological emergence, the weak/strong distinction marks a dividing
line between cases of, say, unpredictability that hold only in practice or that
are to be relativized to a given epistemic situation at a given time, and
cases of unpredictability that are supposed to hold in principle. With re-
gard to ontological emergence, the weak/strong distinction can be appealed
to in order to demarcate between emergentist views that embrace more or
less anti-reductionistic commitments (e.g. while two synchronic, ontological
emergentists are committed to the advent, upon emergence, of new causal
powers, only the “weak” emergentist also embraces – whereas the “strong”
emergentist denies – supervenience).
Figure 1: A compartmentalization of the conceptual landscape of emergence.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned distinctions cut across each
other, to the effect that, together, they can help compartmentalize the con-
ceptual landscape of emergence in eight different regions (see figure 1). Other
1In this we follow Van Gullick (2001)’s suggestion. We must bring to the reader’s
attention that this construal of the weak/strong distinction is not the most widespread.
It is indeed often appealed to in order to mark a dividing line between what we have
chosen to refer to here as the epistemological versus the ontological character of emergence
(see for instance Smart 1981; or Bedau 1997). Accordingly and for example, whereas
Bedau qualifies his own account as “weak” – for it is to be contrasted with ontological
accounts essentially based on downward causation –, we will rather consider it as “strongly
epistemological”, insofar as the (epistemological) irreducibility involved has an objective
– rather than merely subjective – character. At the end of the day, this turns out to be
purely terminological.
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distinctions could be put forward to further refine this picture, but this
coarse-grained analysis is precise enough to constitute the starting point of
the discussion to come.
3 A new look at emergence
In this section, we probe a specific region of the conceptual landscape of
emergence that has been under-appreciated in recent discussions, namely
diachronic, weakly ontological emergence. In particular, after having vin-
dicated the fact that diachronic emergence is emergence in its own right
(section 3.1), we put forward an account of [te]. We first devise it in a
metaphysical sense (section 3.2), before operationalizing it in a way that
makes it possible to find evidence that it can be exemplified in our world
(section 3.3). Finally, after having compared [te] to its neighboring accounts
in the conceptual landscape of emergence (section 3.4), we defend its fruit-
fulness in solving or avoiding some traditional vexing issues that bear on the
contemporary debates (section 3.5), but also in having a strong empirical
support in contemporary science (section 4).
3.1 Preamble: diachronic emergence is emergence
Since the recent resurgence of emergence, different sets of fields have focused
on different specific parts of the conceptual landscape of emergence. In the
main context within which emergence has been – and still is – a hot topic,
namely the philosophy of mind, all of the philosophers’ attention seems to
have been systematically drawn on the synchronic varieties of the concept
(see table 1).
Epistemological Ontological
Weak Nagel (1961) Gillett (2002)
Strong Searle (1992) Popper (1977)
Table 1: Sample of varieties of synchronic emergence in the philosophy of mind.
Nagel is of course not to be considered as a philosopher of mind, but his account
of emergence is built upon a criticism of Broad (1925)’s emergence, which was
supposed to capture the mind/body relation.
Apart perhaps from some exceptions, synchronic varieties of emergence
fail to apply in a realistic way to situations encountered in the natural sci-
ences, where systems usually encapsulate an important temporal dimension
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that seems to play a crucial role in any putative emergence ascription.2
To see this, suffice it to draw the attention on the fact that most of the
empirically-informed accounts of emergence taking shape within the context
of the natural sciences are developed in an essentially diachronic fashion (see
table 2).
Epistemological Ontological
Weak Rueger (2000) Wilson (2010)
Strong Bedau (1997) Humphreys (1997)
Table 2: Sample of varieties of diachronic emergence in philosophy of science.
Without formulating any hypothesis about the reasons of such a dis-
crepancy between both communities of philosophers in the way they make
use of emergence, it has to be noted that synchronic emergence is often
claimed to be the only “genuine” kind of emergence, diachronic emergence
being simply dismissed as a recent proposal that deviates too much from
the “classical conception”, which is usually traced back to Broad (1925)’s
synchronic account (see Kim 1999, p. 20; or Kim 2006, p. 555).
It is actually not difficult to resist such line of thought, particularly if
one chooses to evaluate the “classicality” of emergence in terms of its his-
torical genesis. It indeed turns out that the first explicit characterization
of emergence to be found in history was essentially diachronic, though also
concomitantly synchronic. After Lewes’ somewhat anecdotal contribution in
1875, the first philosophical doctrine that can be considered an emergentist
school, namely Lloyd Morgan’s “emergent evolutionism”, was indeed entirely
built upon a notion of emergence that was supposed to be the philosophical
tool allowing a reconciliation between Darwinian gradualism and the suc-
cessive and incessant advent of historical novelties in evolution, to the effect
that “there is more in the world to-day than there was in the primitive fire-
mist” (Morgan 1913, p. 30). As a characterization of emergence that was
supposed to achieve such a reconciliatory job, we can find in Morgan’s writ-
ings that there is emergence at play, for example in the chemical synthesis
of two compounds, when (depx) the synthesized compound is the product
of the reactants and (novx) the synthesized compound has “new and dis-
2A similar diagnosis is made, in the peculiar case of cognitive science, by Stephan
(2006). It should be noted that there of course exist in contemporary philosophy of science
accounts of emergence that encapsulate both a synchronic and a diachronic dimensions
(e.g. Morrison 2006; or Batterman 2011). To avoid any ambiguity, in what follows we
then reserve the generic term of “synchronic emergence” to denote accounts that can be
considered as “purely” synchronic.
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tinctive properties which are not merely the algebraic sum of the properties
of the component things prior to synthesis” (Ibid., p. 28, our italics). As an
operationalization of (novx), Morgan proposed that these new properties
were “unpredictable from what one may perhaps speak of as the fire-mist’s
point of view” (Ibid., p. 30). This being said about what certainly is the
most “classical” construal of emergence, one may wonder whether clauses
(depx) and (novx) turn out to be something else than a particular version of
(depd) and (novd). “Classical” emergence is then clearly (also) diachronic
emergence
3.2 Transformational emergence: a metaphysical account
This being said, we can turn to providing a new account of one possible
declination of diachronic emergence, namely [te].
To start with, let us consider a natural system S at two successive times
t1 and t2 of its evolution. One will say – and in this lies the general, meta-
physical account of [te] – that the given system at t2 (S2) transformationally
emerges from the same system at t1 (S1) if and only if there exists a trans-
formation [Tr] such that:3
• (depd) S2 is the product of a spatiotemporally continuous process
going from S1 (for example causal, and possibly fully deterministic).
In particular, the “realm” R to which S1 and S2 commonly belong
(e.g. the physical realm) is closed, to the effect that nothing outside
of R participates in S1 bringing about S2.
4 And yet:
• (novd) S2 exhibits new entities, properties or powers that do not exist
in S1, and that are furthermore forbidden to exist in S1 according to
the laws {Li1}ni=1 governing S1. Accordingly, different laws {Li2}mi=1
govern S2.
3Whereas we claim that, as such, the account proposed here is unprecedented in the
literature, it is of course not without forerunners. In particular, we owe a great debt of
gratitude to Paul Humphreys, who presented to us the original idea and coined the term
“transformational emergence”. A similar intuition is also to be found in Ganeri (2011),
though in a very different context.
4As it has been stated, what (depd) tolerates is that contextual elements jointly par-
ticipate with S1 to bring about S2. What (depd) denies, though, is that these elements
act as radically extrinsic influences that should bring the novelty in emergence from the
outside. It should also be pointed out that we take determinism to mean that, should S’s
evolution be deterministic, S’s history would be univocally fixed. This doesn’t entail that
S’s future evolution can be predicted (Earman 2007), nor that previously inexistent laws
cannot appear now and then during S’s evolution (Sartenaer 2015).
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It is noteworthy that the “forbidden” expression occuring in (novd) in-
troduces a modality aspect to [te], according to which, upon emergence, an
ontological domain that was previously barred – including entities and their
properties, subject to specific laws – becomes accessible.5 It should also be
emphasized that, at best, the sets of laws {Li1}ni=1 and {Li2}mi=1 partially
overlap. It is indeed part of the account that at least one law La2 of S2 is
inconsistent with the set {Li1}ni=1.6
In a nutshell, the proposed account operates a perspective shift with
regard to the more usual way of looking at emergence. The general frame one
has generally in mind when making an emergence ascription is schematically
captured in the upper left corner of figure 2. When some given n1-level
entities in isolation at time t1 – be they atoms, cells or organisms – are put
together in a specific configuration at time t2, they can collectively give rise
to a hypothetical n2-level whole. On this basis, one can choose to adopt two
different perspectives in order to formulate an emergence ascription. On the
one hand, and this is the most widespread, usual way of looking at this, one
can consider there being emergence because of the very special nature of
the inter-level determinative relation [C] that occurs between the parts and
the putatively emergent whole at t2 (case (i) on figure 2) and, accordingly,
one can leave aside or abstract away the historical process prior to t2. Here
the real drive of emergence is to be localized in a synchronic part-whole
relation [C] of a very special nature – e.g. as capturing the conjunction of
(mereological) supervenience (deps) and irreducibility (novs). In this first
respect, one often rhetorically claims that “the whole is more than the sum
of its parts” or that “more is different”.
On the other hand, and this is the perspective shift encapsulated in [te],
one can choose to leave aside these holistic considerations and ground an
emergence ascription in a transformation [Tr] of a very special nature, which
the entities at t1 encounter upon entering into their interactive configuration
at t2 (case (ii) on figure 2). Here the real drive of emergence is to be found
in a diachronic determinative relation [Tr] that captures (depd) and (novd)
as formulated above (and to be operationalized below). In contrast with the
more widespread way of looking at emergence, here one can claim that “the
whole is the sum of the transformed parts” or that “after is different”7.
5This definition supposes that S’s dynamics is entirely captured by the relevant set of
natural laws.
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for having drawn our attention on this point.
7As the first of these slogans makes clear, the very notion of a “whole” is radically
deflated in the transformational perspective, as it is claimed to be simply identical with
– or reducible to, in the synchronic sense – the sum of its transformed parts (the notion
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Figure 2: A perspective shift on emergence. One can ground any emergence
ascription by putting the burden of a suitable reconciliation of (dep) and (nov)
either on (i) the synchronic relation [C] between levels or (ii) the transformational
relation [Tr] between successive times.
3.3 The epistemic effects induced by transformational emer-
gence
This far, we have cooked up an account that captures a relation that re-
mains something like a mere metaphysical possibility not yet fully investi-
gated by philosophers. Even restricted to this, [te] already offers several
non-negligible advantages over some of its competitors on the philosoph-
ical market and, as such, it is worthwhile to consider it as a convenient
theoretical tool to solve or avoid some traditional issues surrounding the
emergence/reduction debate, while preserving some strong intuitions about
emergence (see in particular section 3.5). However, we have reasons to think
of “sum” is taken here metaphorically, as a way of echoing the traditional slogan; it
can actually capture any kind of combinatorial principle, linear or not). Accordingly,
one can of course still talk about wholes or collectives, but this is simply a linguistic
shortcut that doesn’t have any ontological import over and above what happens at the
level of the parts (which is the only ontologically significative level). Of course, one
could combine this diachronic and “flat” approach to emergence with a synchronic and
hierarchical perspective, and hence devise an hybrid notion that encapsulates both the
perspectives discussed here. But this simply isn’t [te] as we conceive of it.
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that [te] captures more than a metaphysically plausible relation. As we will
show in section 4, we believe there are empirical cases of [te] in our world.
In this respect, beside being of possible interest for metaphysicians, [te] has
also some philosophical work to do in the natural sciences.
To see this, it is necessary to provide beforehand what we consider an
operationalization of [te], that is, a translation of its underlying metaphysi-
cal intuitions into formal requirements that can enter into dialogue with the
sciences. Because we cannot claim to have a privileged and direct access to
the ontology of natural systems, the best we can do is to recast ontological
claims like (depd) and (novd) into claims about the traces that [Tr] leaves
in the formal constructs we use to investigate these natural systems, on the
following model (see also figure 3):
Figure 3: The traces that [Tr] leaves in our way of investigating S.
• (C1) M1 and M2, which both describe the same system at two succes-
sive stages S1 and S2 of its evolution, are models of one and the same
non-trivial theory T . And yet:
• (C2) M2 is not derivable from M1 as a matter of principle, for M2
contains features that are forbidden in M1 according to theory T .
More precisely, S2’s dynamics as described by M2 is not continuously
deformable into S1’s dynamics as described by M1.
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8Here we take “dynamics” in an unrestricted sense that can be distinctively imple-
mented in different disciplinary contexts, and that can be construed as whatever fixes
the possible kind of evolution of a system with respect to a given model. In the case
10
As intended, (C1) and (C2) capture the epistemic effects induced by
the ontology of [te] and, as such, they are also the best available pieces of
evidence – at least when they are successfully met in a given situation –
that there is [te] at play. (C1) states that S1 and S2 are states of one
and the same system or, to put it differently, that S1 and S2 are states
of a same kind, defined by theory T . Nothing exterior to the realm R to
which S1 and S2 commonly belong, and which should be modeled in the
context of another theory T ′, is at stake in [Tr]. Through in-principle non-
derivability, (C2) captures the effect of the novelty involved in [te]. The fact
that it is impossible to describe S2’s dynamics in M1, that is, to describe
S2’s dynamics as a smooth deformation of S1’s dynamics, combined with
the idea that a system’s dynamics as we capture it through our model is the
best (and only indirect) access we have to the system’s ontology, constitute
the most convincing clue that S2 exhibits new features that are forbidden
to exist, according to natural laws, in S1. As an epistemic side-effect, it also
follows from (C2) that, prior to t2, it is impossible in principle to predict or
etiologically explain the nature and behavior of S2 from complete knowledge
of S1 (though this is possible from knowledge of theory T and the appropriate
conditions that define S2).
As we will see in section 4, the way of physically cashing out [Tr] will
be accomplished through the notion of a transition between distinct topo-
logical orders: there will be [te] in our world as soon as a given system ex-
hibits a transformation such that its post-transformation state corresponds
to a state of matter in a topological order that is not accessible to any
of its pre-transformation states, according to the laws governing these pre-
transformation states.
3.4 Transformational emergence in the conceptual landscape
of emergence
At this point, it can prove helpful to localize [te] in the conceptual landscape
of emergence exposed in section 2.2. In particular, [te] lies in the region of
diachronic, weakly ontological varieties of the notion (see figure 4).
of physics, one can expect to detect (C2) into what codes for the dynamics of systems,
namely their Lagrangian or Hamiltonian. It is noteworthy that focusing on the way in
which the dynamics evolves has already been considered elsewhere as the best way to
ground claims about what counts as “truly” novel or not in the evolution of a physical
system. See for instance Rueger 2000 or Morrison 2006. It is also noteworthy that here
we take [Tr] as what leads from S1’s dynamics to S2’s dynamics, but not as a dynamical
process in itself. As with respect to the possible relation between laws and dynamics, the
scope of this paper compels us to remain agnostic.
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As it is already clear in the account proposed above, [te] is a diachronic
relation, as the putative emergent and its basis are related by a tempo-
rally extended determinative relation that allows for the advent of historical
novelties. [te] is also ontological, for it leads to the advent of new enti-
ties, powers, forces and laws in nature, and this in spite of the fact that
transformational emergents are the continuous products of their bases. Of
course, as we have seen, such additions to the world’s ontology are system-
atically accompanied by principled epistemological effects – non-derivability
of models, etiological unexplainability and unpredictability –, which we can
use – and, as it turns out, which we will use below – as evidence in favor
of the existence of transformational emergents in our world. Finally, [te]
is only ontological in a weak sense, insofar as it is a monism-friendly rela-
tion. If one considers S as being a physical system, the emergence of a state
S2 on a previous state S1 indeed turns out to be perfectly consistent with
physicalism as well as with the causal closure of the physical world.
Figure 4: [te] as a form of diachronic, weakly ontological emergence, which can
be seen as a moderation of Humphreys (1997), a reification of Rueger (2000), or a
temporalization of Hendry (2010)’s accounts of emergence.
This being said, we can now compare [te] to its neighboring accounts
in the conceptual landscape of emergence (see again figure 4). A first way
of looking at [te] is as a moderation of Humphreys’ original “fusion ac-
count” (Humphreys 1997). If one considers P im(x
i
r)(t) as being the instan-
tiation of an i-level property P im by an i-level entity x
i
r at time t, and
[. ∗ .] as being the “fusion operation”, then fusion emergentism states that
[P im(x
i
r)(t) ∗ P in(xis)(t)] = [P im ∗ P in][(xir) + (xis)](t′) and [P im ∗ P in][(xir) +
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(xis)](t
′) = P i+1l (x
i+1
l (t
′)). Among the ideas encapsulated in these expres-
sions, there is the fact that fusion is a diachronic operation (t′ > t), which
gives rise, from i-level property instances, to an (i+1)-level property instance
[level jump], and which is such that, at t′, the fused property instances have
ceased to exist as separate entities [basal loss]. Consequently, there is no su-
pervenience of P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) on any underlying, simultaneous basis, there
is no threat of causal overdetermination that could prevent us from consid-
ering that P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) can exert its own (irreducible) causal powers, and
causal closure breaks down. On this basis, fusion emergentism states that
P i+1l (x
i+1
l )(t
′) emerges – in a diachronic, strongly ontological sense – from
P im(x
i
r)(t) and P
i
n(x
i
s)(t).
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As such, fusion emergentism faces at least two issues. First, it is not
clear that the account can be empirically exemplified (Kronz & Tiehen
2002), despite Humphreys’ own “reasonably confident” claim that quan-
tum entanglement constitutes the basis for such an exemplification. Second,
the whole account heavily rests on the existence (and the definability) of a
discrete hierarchy of levels, a commitment that Humphreys himself consid-
ers “misleading and probably false” (Humphreys 1997, p. 5), but that he
nonetheless accepts as a hypothesis given the initial rationale of the fusion
account, namely formulating a plausible theory of emergence that is immune
to generalized exclusion-style arguments, according to which some minimal
dependence relation between levels is incompatible with genuine high-level
causation.
Now one is in a position to appreciate why Humphreys himself seems to
have recently given up on fusion emergentism in favor of something along the
lines of [te] (Humphreys, unpublished). For one thing, the initial rationale
for cooking up fusion emergence, namely to avoid exclusion-style worries,
is perfectly met by [te] (see section 3.5). Furthermore, this is achieved
without falling into the issues mentioned above, which fusion emergentism
faces. Indeed, [te] has a stronger empirical support (see section 4) and no
misleading account of a discrete hierarchy of levels has to be hypothesized
(see also section 3.5).
In 1997, fusion emergentism was an unprecedented move from the syn-
chronic view of emergence towards a pioneering diachronic account better
suited to capture the specific nature of physical systems. In 2016, [te]
constitutes a new step in the same direction, by getting rid of the last prob-
9The diachronic and ontological nature of fusion emergence is obvious from what has
just been said. The fact that it is strongly ontological has to be contrasted with the weakly
ontological character of [te]. As we’ve seen, [te] actually tolerates causal closure as well
as supervenience, beside not being committed to the existence of high-level causal powers.
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lematic remnants of the synchronic view with which fusion emergence is
somewhat still marred, namely the features that are tied to commitments
about the existence of a discrete natural hierarchy, like level jump, (failure
of) supervenience or high-level causation.
When it comes to localizing [te] in the conceptual landscape of emer-
gence, a second account onto which it is interesting to draw one’s attention
is Rueger (2000)’s rather idiosyncratic account. In a nutshell, it consists in
asserting that a system’s behavior S2 at time t2 is emergent on the same
system’s behavior S1 at time t1 iff the following thesis obtains:
10
• (novd) The phase space portrait that would describe S2 during a time
lapse where no environmental parameter is modified is not topolog-
ically equivalent to the phase space portrait that would describe S1
during a time lapse where no environmental parameter is modified.
By topological non-equivalence between phase state portraits, it is meant
that there is no smooth transformation that could convert the phase state
trajectory of S2 (during a time lapse where no environmental parameter is
modified) into the phase state trajectory of S1 (during a time lapse where
no environmental parameter is modified). Typically, for S2 to emerge on
S1, it is then necessary that, between t1 and t2, some control parameter
reach a critical value corresponding to a bifurcation into the behavior of
S. Qualitatively novel – hence emergent – behaviors are also considered by
Rueger to be “irreducible”, in the non-commonsensical “intralevel” sense
that S2’s description doesn’t “smoothly go over” into S1’s description in the
appropriate limit of the control parameter.
Rueger’s account of emergence can be considered as diachronic and
weakly epistemological.11 It is epistemological, insofar as the criteria for
10The way we formulate Rueger’s novelty thesis here is somewhat cumbersome, but we
don’t know of a better way to phrase it, insofar as it rests on a confusion within Rueger’s
own account. At some point, Rueger indeed states that the relata of emergence are the
behavior of a system at a given moment and the behavior of the same system at some
earlier moment (typically when, in between, a critical point in a control parameter has
been reached; see p. 300). But at some other places (p. 303), the relata of emergence
are supposed to be a given system (for which a control parameter is at critical value) and
another so-called ”reference” system (for which the control parameter is not at critical
value). Perhaps the fact that both interpretative options are available is the reason why
Rueger doesn’t explicitly formulate a dependence thesis, for it doesn’t fully make sense in
the second case. In any case, we embrace the first option here – viz. when the relata of
emergence are successive behaviors of one and the same system –, for we think it captures
Rueger’s intuition and it involves embracing a dependence thesis along the lines of (depd).
11Rueger himself qualifies his account as “weak”, but this seems to cover what we refer to
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emergence – topological non-equivalence and (intralevel) irreducibility – are
about relations between descriptions of behavior. And it is epistemological
in a weak sense, as it is compatible with in-principle – and actually even
with practical – predictability or etiological explainability of the emergents
from knowledge of their basis.12 On this basis, one can consider [te] as
a reification or an ontologization of Rueger’s emergence, where qualitative
novelty between successive behaviors of a given system is not to be restricted
to a mere descriptive feature, but has rather to do with genuine additions
to the system’s ontology. More precisely, instead of merely considering that,
upon emergence, the phase space portrait of a system can be modified in
a discontinuous way, [te] requires that whole areas of the system’s phase
space, which were prohibited according to the natural laws governing the
pre-emergence state, become accessible to the system upon emergence. Ac-
cordingly, the epistemological effect of such an ontological novelty is more
drastic than the one associated with Rueger’s account: with [te], “intralevel
irreducibility” amounts to in-principle unpredictability or etiological unex-
plainability from knowledge of any pre-emergence state. A consequence of
[te] being more ontologically engaged than Rueger’s emergence is that it is
more philosophically fruitful – it has higher stakes with regard to scientific
practice – but less empirically mundane.
Finally, a third neighboring account of [te] has recently been put forward
by Hendry (2010). Hendry’s account essentially rests on what he refers to as
a “counternomic criterion”, according to which the behavior of an emergent
entity would be different were it determined only by the laws that govern
its composing sub-entities. Framed along the lines we have chosen to use in
this paper, Hendry’s criterion is basically that a given entity E is emergent
on a basis B as soon as the following obtain:
here as “epistemological”. For him, “weakly” emergent properties are indeed properties
that are also structural or “resultant”, that is, properties that are defined in terms of
lower-level properties and relations (in the diachronic, purely intralevel case, this notion is
somewhat degenerate). This is in sharp contrast with ontological accounts that consider
non-structurality as a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) requirement for emergence
(e.g. Humpheyrs 1997 in the diachronic case; O’Connor 1994 in the synchronic case).
12This can be seen on the basis of the empirical illustration of Rueger’s diachronic
emergence that is the originally damped oscillator that becomes undamped (so the control
parameter – the damping – reaches its critical null value). There is emergence in this
context, for the undamped oscillator has a phase space portrait that looks like an ellipse,
whereas the phase space portrait of the damped oscillator is a topologically non-equivalent
spiral. In spite of this emergence, one could thoroughly predict in practice what would be
the behavior of an undamped oscillator from knowledge of the laws governing its damped
counterpart.
15
• (deps) E is composed of B; and yet
• (novs) New, sui generis laws govern the behavior of E, conferring it
new, irreducible causal powers (and, in particular, downwardly ori-
ented causal powers).
This is obviously an ontological account of synchronic emergence and,
as such, Hendry is in need of operationalizing it in order to investigate
its possible empirical exemplifications. This is achieved through a strategy
we will also use in section 4 with regard to [te], namely recasting thesis
(novs) (in our case (novd)) into terms about what captures the ontology of
laws and powers – physicists would say “dynamics” – in physical systems,
viz. their Hamiltonians (or, in our case, their Lagrangians). Here is (our
reconstruction of) the core of Hendry’s move in this respect:
• (CH1 ) The Hamiltonians capturing the dynamics of E and B are models
of one and the same non-trivial theory T , namely quantum mechanics.
Accordingly, E andB are both quantum-mechanical systems. And yet:
• (CH2 ) E’s dynamics is captured by a “configurational” Hamiltonian,
i.e. a Hamiltonian that is not resultant from – or is of an “independent
kind” of Hamiltonian with regard to – the Hamiltonians that capture
the dynamics of B.
According to Hendry, molecular structures meet his counternomic cri-
terion and, in its wake, (CH1 ) and (C
H
2 ). Accordingly, molecular structures
are ontologically emergent from a quantum mechanical basis made of elec-
trons and nuclei interacting via Coulomb forces. In Hendry’s view, molecu-
lar Hamiltonians are then cases of configurational Hamiltonians, and hence
cannot be seen as merely resulting from underlying atomic Hamiltonians.
This formal fact is appealed to in order to justify the ontological fact that
molecules do have powers irreducible to that of their underlying elements
– electrons and nuclei –, and the former obey sui generis laws that do not
govern the behavior of the latter.13 This can be empirically motivated: as
cases of isomers attest, molecular structures play a causally relevant role
in many chemical phenomena through their symmetry properties, although
13Of course the fact that irreducible (classes of) Hamiltonians are supposed to mirror
irreducible laws and powers is questionable, especially given that philosophers of science
sometimes consider Hamiltonians as being mere models. We think nonetheless that this
is a key component of Hendry’s intuition about the relationship between physics and
metaphysics.
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these properties cannot be traced to – nor recovered from – atomic consid-
erations.14
In the terminology we are by now used to, Hendry’s emergence can be
considered as a form of synchronic, weakly ontological emergence. The fact
that it is synchronic – and hence hierarchical – as well as ontological – and
hence induces principled epistemic effects – is obvious from the reconstruc-
tion laid down above. It is also weakly ontological in the sense that it remains
ontologically shallow with regard to other accounts of synchronic ontolog-
ical emergence that involves non-structurality, a failure of supervenience,
unrealized powers or a denial of physicalism.15 In this respect, Hendry’s
emergence constitutes a synchronic counterpart to [te], or the latter can
be seen as a temporalization – i.e. a conversion of level discreteness into
temporal ordering – of the former.
3.5 Transformational emergence: some advantages
In this final subsection before turning to providing empirical support for [te],
we stress the sense in which the account solves or avoids some traditional
issues that surround the current debates about emergence, while keeping
untouched the main stakes and intuitions that underlie most of the uses of
the concept.
As we’ve already touched upon above, one first advantage of [te] is that
the account doesn’t need to posit a discrete hierarchy of levels of nature,
within which each system should find a proper place. Such a feature of
[te] actually constitutes the core of the perspective shift that the account
captures, in the light of which the drive of emergence is to be found in the
way some entities are temporally – instead of hierarchically – related. In
a word, [te] can thus perfectly tolerate a thorough hierarchical egalitari-
anism. Of course, this doesn’t entail that organization, collective behavior,
composition, etc., don’t have an important role to play in the nature or in
the representation of natural systems. Rather, these notions are secondary
14It is at this point that Hendry appeals to a specific construal of the Born-Oppenheimer
approximation, which is systematically used in order to be able to solve molecular
Schro¨dinger equations that otherwise would remain untractable. According to Hendry, far
from being a mere approximation, this procedure leads to adding a structure to molecules
by hand, insofar as it involves breaking the symmetry of what the solutions (of spherical
symmetry) to the exact molecular Schro¨dinger equation would be.
15True, Hendry’s account leads to a breaking of the causal closure of physics, but it
remains consistent with the weaker principle that is the “ubiquity of physics”, according
to which “physical principles constrain the motions of particular systems though they may
not fully determine them” (Hendry 2010, p. 188).
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when it specifically comes to ascriptions of [te], and can be seen under a
deflationary, heuristically-inclined perspective about levels (e.g. construed
in terms of scales; see Potochnik & McGill 2012). From the outset, such an
ontological indifference about hierarchies makes [te] well-suited for scien-
tific contexts where level-talk always seems artificial and problematic, e.g.
in physics.
As a beneficial side-effect of this, [te] is not threatened by exclusion-style
arguments, which can be devastating for synchronic versions of ontological
emergence (see, for instance, Kim 1999). In a nutshell, those types of argu-
ments are devised to show that the conjunction of some construals of (deps)
and (novs) are plainly inconsistant with some highly plausible metaphysi-
cal theses like the causal closure of the physical world and the impossibility
of systematic causal overdetermination. In the face of such worries, and
if they don’t want to simply get rid of emergence altogether by giving up
either on (deps) – hence moving towards dualism – or (novs) – hence em-
bracing reductionism –, synchronic emergentists tend to be forced to making
bold moves like, to mention but one example, introducing an exotic and un-
precedented, neither causal nor compositional, determinative relation like
“machresis” (Gillett 2010). By contrast, [te] is unconcerned with exclu-
sion worries, for the simple reason that transformational emergents do not
causally compete with their bases – so there isn’t a risk of facing causal
overdetermination –, since these are not simultaneously instantiated. More
specifically, there is also no room in [te] for the controversial notion of
downward causation – or any peculiar declination of it, under the form of
downward constraint, regulation or determination –, so there is no need to
settle long-standing disputes about whether causation should be seen as pro-
ductive or counterfactual, synchronic or diachronic, efficient or also formal,
etc. in order to devise the account. As such, the prima facie plausibility of
[te] as a legitimate version of emergence undermines Kim’s contention that
“downward causation is the very raison d’eˆtre of emergence, but it may well
turn out to be what in the end undermines it” (Kim 2006, p. 548).
It is important to note that, even if [te] gets rid of tenets that play a
crucial role in other forms of ontological emergentism, it preserves the most
important intuitions of the doctrine. First, as far as causation is concerned,
[te] captures the idea that the advent of emergents makes a difference in
the world, in the spirit of the so-called anti-epiphenomenalist dictum of
Alexander – “To be real is [...] to possess causal powers” –, without having
to adopt a dualistic stance. The new causal powers that arise through [te]
can even be said to be “irreducible” in most of the usual senses of the word.
As a consequence of (novd), and more particularly of the clause stating
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that transformationally emergent powers are forbidden to exist, according to
natural laws, prior to their emergence, transformationally emergent powers
are not identical to the powers of their bases, they are not a subset of the
powers of their bases, they are not realized in the powers of their bases – so
there is no issue of “causal inheritance” between them –, they are not the
mere manifestation of some initially latent powers of their bases, etc.
Second, with respect to epistemological concerns, [te] preserves the in-
tuition that emergents are non deducible, not predictable or not explainable
from complete knowledge of their bases. And what matters here is that
[te] does so without having to be committed to some problematic ideas
like downward causation or that emergents are brute, sui generis empiri-
cal facts that must be “simply swallowed whole with that philosophic jam
which Professor Alexander calls ‘natural piety”’ (Broad 1925, p. 55). As
we will indeed see in section 4, there can be a perfectly legitimate physi-
cal explanation of why transformational emergents are to appear at some
point in the evolution of systems. Of course, the fact that one can explain
the advent of transformational emergents seems to be in conflict with the
idea that transformational emergents are in some sense unexplainable in
principle. The conflict envisioned here is actually simply apparent : trans-
formational emergents are unexplainable in principle from knowledge of their
bases, but they are not unexplainable tout court, to the effect that [te], in
contrast with classic emergent evolutionism, does not have to fall into obscu-
rantism.16 Put differently, when it comes to providing illumination about
the advent of transformational emergents, [te] states that some explanatory
paths are forever impracticable – typically the paths going directly from the
bases to the emergents –, but not that no explanatory path whatsoever
should be available.
To summarize, [te] is a bona fide account of emergence that makes sense
of the very hallmark of the notion, namely a reconciliation of theses (dep)
and (nov). It does so in a diachronic fashion, consistently with some of the
original intuitions that have historically led to the advent of the first emer-
gentist doctrine. It also does so while preserving some widespread intuitions
about emergence, viz. that emergents have irreducible causal powers and
that, accordingly, they are epistemologically broken off from their bases.
Finally, it does so while avoiding some traditional perplexities stemming
primarily from the commitment to the existence of a discrete hierarchy of
levels in nature. Now, all transformational emergence needs in order to
16That’d better be the case, for, as we will see, people won the Nobel prize for their
discovery and account of phenomena that we will qualify as transformationally emergent.
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be more than a nice philosophical tool is at least one concrete empirical
exemplification. We provide one in what follows.
4 Transformational emergence in the physical world
Our goal in this section is to put some scientific meat on the two requirements
(depd) and (novd) using the theoretical clues (C1) and (C2) discussed above.
We will show two things: there exists a theoretical possibility of [te] in
quantum physics (section 4.1). In particular, we will show it in the context of
quantum field theory, but it can also be achieved in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. We will then argue that such a case has been experimentally
produced (section 4.2). In other words, we believe there is empirical support
for [te].
4.1 Theoretical exemplification of transformational emergence
We will argue that if a certain physical transformation [Tr] could transform
a physical system in state S1, dynamically described by a model of quantum
electrodynamics in 3+1 dimensions (QED4), into the same physical system
in a state S2, dynamically described by a model of quantum electrodynamics
in 2+1 dimensions (QED3), then this transformation should be considered
as leading to [te].
Figure 5: Theoretical exemplification of [te].
The first step is to show that such a [Tr] meets (depd) and, in particular,
the clue (C1) it is associated with. In this regard, we claim that QED4 and
QED3 are both models of one and the same non-trivial theory T , namely
QED, the general quantum field theory that characterizes electromagnetic
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interactions. QED is defined as the quantum field theory for which the
following – not necessarily independent – requirements are true:
1. Poincare´ invariance. The dynamics should be invariant under trans-
lation in time and space, rotations in space and boosts. Obviously the
exact composition of the symmetry group will depend of the dimen-
sionality of spacetime.
2. U(1) local gauge invariance. The theory should be invariant under
the following transformations: Aµ → Aµ+ 1e∂µΩ, ψ → eiΩψ, where Aµ
is the gauge potential, ψ the matter field, e the electric charge associ-
ated with matter, and Ω a smooth function of the spacetime manifold.
This symmetry is the signature of an electromagnetic interaction.
3. Minimal coupling. The interacting term in the Lagrangian density
should be of the form LI = −JµAµ, where Jµ is the charged parti-
cles’ current. In other words, Aµ acts geometrically like a connection
in a principal fibre bundle. This requirement aims to exclude exotic
interaction terms that would not be assimilable to electromagnetism.
4. The gauge equations are of the Maxwell type. The equations of
movement for the gauge field do not make reference to the vector po-
tential but only to the the field-strength tensor. In 3+1 dimensions, we
should obtain the Maxwell equations and the known Bianchi identity
for the dual field-strength tensor.
5. Usual matter solutions. For example, in the case of massive spinor
electrodynamics, the matter terms of the Lagrangian should be LM =
ψ¯(i/∂−m)ψ, where m is the matter mass. This choice guarantees that
in absence of electromagnetic interaction, the Dirac equation will be
the Euler-Lagrange equation. A similar requirement goes for other
kinds of matter. This necessary condition excludes the possibility of
introducing exotic matter directly into the Lagrangian. Possible new
matter solutions could only come through new solutions to the same
Lagrangian ingredients. This condition is not as fundamental as the
others and could be relaxed.
Together, these five requirements theoretically circumscribe a type of phe-
nomenon. Any model/theory falling under these describes a type of quantum
electrodynamics phenomenon.
Obviously, QED4 (electrodynamics of fermions) is a model of QED. But
what about QED3? Let us look at a particular model. What follows is the
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Lagrangian density of a QED3 model for spinors:
LQED3 = LMatter + LInteraction + LGauge
= ψ¯(i/∂ −m)ψ − JµAµ + 1
4
(Fµν)
2 +
θ
4
εαµνAαFµν ,
where θ is a constant and εαµν is the total antisymmetric tensor. The last
term of the Lagrangian is called the Chern-Simons term.
Let us check whether this L meets the definitional requirements of QED.
This Lagrangian density is clearly Poincare´ invariant (1). LM +LI is gauge
invariant. As for LG, it transforms by a total derivative in the following
way: LG → LG +∂α( θ4eεαµνFµνΩ). For vanishing Fµν and Ω at the borders,
this derivative equals 0 (2). We have a minimal coupling (3). The Euler-
Lagrange equations for the gauge field are of the Maxwell type (4). Finally,
LM generates the Dirac equation if we use the 2-dimensional realization of
the Dirac algebra for the γ matrix and a dimensionally-reduced ψ (5).
Before going further, let us note some characteristics of the Chern-
Simons term:
• It is topological, that is, it does not depend on the spacetime metric
and does not contribute to the energy. It only depends on the topology
of the spacetime manifold.
• It generates a topological mass for the “photon” (spin 1 excitation
states of the gauge field) (Deser, Jackiw & Templeton 2000).
• It endows the “charged particles” with magnetic fluxes (Deser, Jackiw
& Templeton 2000). These composite flex-tube-particles have frac-
tional statistics (Wilczek 1982). As far as we know, this possibility
does not exist in 3+1 dimensions. We would even affirm that this
modality should be interpreted strongly. If we cannot invoke a no-go
theorem excluding the possibility of fractional statistics for all models
of QED in 3+1 dimensions, the constraints put on this possibility by
topological arguments in the context of non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics seem difficult to overcome (MacKenzie 2000). In consequence,
we will assume that in 3+1 dimensions, only two kinds of statistics
exist.17
17Note that the long range interaction implied here does not contradict the second
characteristics above because the interaction necessary for the fractional statistics is of
the Aharonov-Bohm type and, in consequence, does not require displacement of energy.
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Before discussing (C2), let us address a worry. If we have good reasons
to believe that QED3 is well behaved, we have even better reasons to be-
lieve this is not the case for QED4. Indeed, Haag’s theorem asserts that no
unitarily consistent representation of QED4 could include interacting and
free fields (Earman & Fraser 2006). However, both ingredients seem neces-
sary, especially if one wants to interpret QED4 in terms of particles. Our
response is to notice that this result should not be interpreted as a logical
inconsistency of QED4 in general. The theorem does not exclude the pos-
sibility of finding adequate representations for free or interacting fields. It
only asserts that these representations will not be unitarily equivalent. The
remarkable success of certain applications of QED4 proves that this model is
at least consistent in limited domains. In this context, the more economical
solution is to sustain a local approach of veracity (see Ruetsche 2015).
Now that we’ve shown that (C1) holds and that, consequently, (depd)
can be supported, let us turn to (novd). We need to show that, following
(C2) and with regard to the [Tr] envisioned here, it should not be possible to
obtain QED3 from QED4 and, moreover, there is no continuous limit that
could get QED3 from QED4, to the effect that one should not consider
QED3 as just being QED4 with one less dimension. A 2+1-dimensional
quantum system is not just a restricted 3+1-dimensional quantum system.
This is due to the presence of a new topological term in the Lagrangian,
depending on the dimensionality, which is responsible for the fact thatQED3
exhibit new topological orders, new possible states of matter, that are not
accessible to systems modeled by QED4.
Since topological orders are not as known as more traditional states of
matter, let us say a few words to define what they are.18 Topological or-
ders are quantum states of matter that cannot be completely characterized
by symmetry breaking of (local) order parameters. They are a subset of
quantum orders in which all excitations have finite energy gaps. The as-
sociated quantum phase transitions are defined by the singularities of the
ground-state energy as a function of the parameters of the Hamiltonian.
This made Xiao-Gang Wen assert that “the concept of topological order is
(partially) defined by ground-state degeneracy, which is robust against any
perturbations that can break all of the symmetries” (2004, p. 342).
As it has been well shown by studies in topological quantum field theory,
even if the Chern-Simons term does not contribute to the Hamiltonian, it
makes a significative difference to the ground-state degeneracy. In other
18For a good survey of orders based on symmetry breaking, see Chaikin & Lubensky
[1998].
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words, it does contribute in a significant way to the structure of the ground
state (Witten 1989; Fro¨lich & King 1989). In fact, when the Chern-Simons
term does not vanish, the physical system can exhibit new states of matter
as a topological quantum fluid (Zee 2010, pp. 322-330). These states are
not accessible to a physical system described by QED4. Furthermore, these
states are forbidden in QED4, since they can exhibit fractional statistics.
QED4 is topologically limited to Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics.
In summary, if there exists a physical transformation [Tr] able to make a
system in state S1, for which the dynamics is described byQED4, becomes in
state S2, for which the dynamics is described by QED3 with a non vanishing
Chern-Simons term, then this situation should be interpreted as a case of
[te].
4.2 The empirical support for transformational emergence
The fractional quantum Hall effect (hereafter FQH effect), discovered ex-
perimentally in 1982 by Tsui and Sto¨ner, is, at first sight, a variation of
the integer quantum Hall effect where the Hall conductance takes fractional
values of e2/h. All FQH states share the same symmetry. They possess a
rich internal structure of patterns but cannot be qualified as solid. They
are quantum fluids. These patterns are dynamical. The particular structure
depends of the ground-state degeneracy which is robust against perturba-
tion. According to Wen, this robustness is the sign of universal internal
structures, namely topological orders (2004, p. 342).
A detailed description of the FQH effect is beyond the scope of this paper.
We refer the interested reader to the relevant sections of Lederer (2015). Let
us just say that in the initial state S1, we start with an electron gas in a
conductor. The behavior of this gas is modeled by QED4. [Tr] consists in
the experimental manipulations on this system in order to get one of the
states exhibiting a FQH effect, typically we impose a very strong magnetic
field perpendicular to the conductor, confine the electrons to a thin spatial
slice by controlling the electronic band structure, work at a low enough
temperature, inject a current and measure the resistance perpendicular to
the current and the magnetic field. If the experiment is a success, the state
S2 obtained is a quantum fluid exhibiting fractional statistics.
It has been shown that a pure Chern-Simons theory (with only Chern-
Simons terms) is an adequate effective theory to capture the universal prop-
erties of the FQH state (Schakel 2008). However, this theory is not rich
enough to describe the complex dynamics involved in the effect. To do so,
we have to add to the pure Chern-Simons theory an interaction term be-
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tween the gauge field included in the Chern-Simons terms and the matter
field. We have also to add kinetic/potential terms for the charged matter
(Arovas, Schrieffer & Wilczek 1984; Wen 2004). In fact, this more complete
effective theory is a particular case of QED3 without the kinetic term for
the electromagnetic field and with a connection to a classical external mag-
netic field (both facts are expected in the particular experimental conditions
of the effect). Note again that in this model, even if we start with matter
fields represented by spinors, we can obtain non fermionic (or even bosonic)
solutions, namely anyons. This is why the discovery of the FQH effect was
such a surprise. It is the manifestation in our 3+1-dimensional world of a
kind of physics that theoretically could only exist in 2+1 dimensions. The
FQH experimental setup is an exemplification of [Tr]. We interpret the fact
that this effect has been experimentally produced as an empirical proof that
a case of [te] exists.19
Before going further, let us discuss some possible objections.20 1) We
have described the FQH experimental setup as an exemplification of the
passage from a state described by QED4 to a state described by QED3.
But before the application of the magnetic field, the conductor is probably
already planar. In these circumstances, why not have as a initial model
a 2+1-dimensional model, and thus avoid the problems related to Haag’s
theorem discussed above? It might be possible to exemplify an appropriate
modality difference for [TE] between two 2+1-dimensional models of QED.
However, it is not clear how we could prove that the initial state is best
described by a 2+1-dimensional model. A planar space seems necessary
to be able to describe the FQH effect, and it is not the case for a very
thin conductor.21 Therefore, this seems less controversial to start from a
3+1-dimensional model. 2) In solid state physics, because of the nature
of the systems studied, non-relativistic quantum models (finite number of
degrees of freedom) are preferable to quantum field models (infinite degrees
19A similar claim has been made recently by Lancaster and Pexton (2015). According
to them, fractional quantum Hall states can be said to be emergent in a sense “E3”
that they construe as a modification of Humphreys’ original fusion account, where basal
properties are not lost upon emergence, but rather become “inherently relational” (due
to a specific kind of entanglement at play, viz. long-range entanglement that characterize
topological states of matter). Such an account of the emergence involved in the fractional
quantum Hall effect differs from ours in an important respect: as with fusion emergence,
it is essentially holistic and hierarchical (with levels failing to be related by a relation of
mereological supervenience).
20We thank an anonymous reviewer for having drawn our attention to these possible
worries.
21More on the 2-dimensional idealization can be found in Shech (2015).
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of freedom). This point does not mean that the FQH effect is not a case
of transformational emergence, but that our theoretical representation of
the transformation is maybe not the best one. As mentioned below, it
is possible to make the same argument in the context of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, it is much easier to show the modal
difference between initial and final states in the context of a quantum field
model. This is why we have made this choice. 3) QED3 and QED4 are
Poincare´ invariant. The setup of the FQH effect is not. In fact, non-trivial
boundary conditions are essential features to understand certain aspects of
the effect (Wen 2004, chapter 7). Are the chosen models of QED adequate
for our purpose? We have not claimed that QED3 and QED4 model the
FQH experimental setup in detail. But as we discussed above, they capture
well the universal properties of the system in the initial and final states. If
our goal was to describe specific aspects of the effect, for example to compute
the ground state energy, we would have chosen other models.
We have explained this example using quantum field theory but a simi-
lar demonstration could have been done using non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics. The surprise would have been the same, as it is expressed by the
following quote by Laughlin taken from his Nobel lecture (1999, p. 869):
The fractional quantum Hall state is not adiabatically deformable
to any noninteracting electron state. I am always astonished at
how upset people get over this statement, for with a proper defi-
nition of a state of matter and a full understanding of the integral
quantum Hall effect there is no other possible conclusion. The
Hall conductance would necessarily be quantized to an integer
because it is conserved by the adiabatic map and is an integer
in the noninteracting limit by virtue of gauge invariance and the
discreteness of the electron charge. So the fractional quantum
Hall state is something unprecedented – a new state of matter.
Before closing this subsection, we have to answer to a legitimate ob-
jection. Is a diachronic conception of emergence necessary to interpret the
FQH effect or could we have used a synchronic one? After all, Laughlin
himself seems to have such a conception in mind. Moreover, this option
seems particularly appealing if we understand the FQH effect in terms of
emergent entities rather than emergent states or dynamics. For example,
if anyons are emerging from a base of electrons, the QFH effect could be
understood as a case of synchronic emergence. We have two objections to
this line of thought.
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• Examples of models where anyons are understood as collective behav-
iors of other entities or fields presume, to our knowledge, that the base
is 2+1-dimensional (e.g. see Jain 1989; Fro¨hlich & Marchetti 1989).
This is not surprising since anyons cannot exist in 3+1 dimensions.
This makes the status of the putative emergence base a problem. Are
anyons emerging from 3+1-dimensional or 2+1-dimensional electrons?
It is only the later option that seems theoretically justified. But opting
for it pushes us towards diachronic emergence. These 2+1-dimensional
electrons are indeed not just 3+1-dimensional electrons with one di-
mension less, since the formers have the capacity to generate anyons,
a capacity that the laters do not – and even, as we have seen, cannot –
have. Consequently, the experimental confinement of 3+1-dimensional
electrons is a transformation that generate new capacities. This con-
finement is the crucial first step to produce the emergent physics. It
should be understood as a diachronic process of emergence.
• The second objection is even stronger. In the context of the FQH ef-
fect, the dependance relation between 2+1-dimensional electrons and
anyons could go both ways, in the sense that not only one could con-
ceive of anyons as collectives of 2+1-dimensional electrons, but 2+1-
dimensional electrons could also be seen as the results of the compo-
sition of a certain number of anyons. For example, in a FQH state
where anyons possess a charge of 1/3 of an electron and exhibit a
statistics of 1/3, three of them can combine and form a bound ob-
ject that would be identified to a 2+1-dimensional electron (Zee 2010,
p. 326-327). This may be surprising but not totally unexpected in a
quantum field context where particles are only types of fields config-
urations. What matters here is that such a fact is inconsistent with
conceiving of the FQH effect as a case of purely synchronic emergence,
for the dependance relation (deps) usually appealed to in this context
– e.g. supervenience or realization – doesn’t allow for such a symmetry
between the putative synchronic emergents (anyons) and the putative
emergence basis (2+1-dimensional electrons).
4.3 Another emergentist approach to the FQH effect
In a recent paper, Jonathan Bain used the FQH effect as a concrete example
of emergence (2013). His philosophical conception of what is emergence is
not easy to pinpoint since he moves swiftly and seemingly between epis-
temological (non-deducibility) and ontological (dynamical distinctiveness)
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considerations. Nevertheless, his treatment of the FQH effect is relatively
clear.
Bain notes that a pure Chern-Simons theory captures well the universal
features of the FQH effect. It does not fully describe the effect but it is
a good effective field theory (hereafter EFT). He also notes that the high-
energy degrees of freedom of the system are more fully described by a type of
nonrelativisticQED3. For Bain, the emergence involved is not the process of
passing from a state (best) described by QED4 to a state (best) described
by QED3, but from a state (best) described by QED3 to a state (best)
described by a pure Chern-Simons theory (the EFT), that is from a theory
with a Chern-Simons term to a theory with only Chern-Simons terms.22
Why should we consider such a process as emergent?
First, the dependence clause is easily filled. The pure Chern-Simons the-
ory is an effective theory of QED3. The degrees of freedom of QED3 can be
identified as low-energy degrees of freedom of the pure Chern-Simons theory.
In consequence, both theories describe the same kind of phenomena. It is
the novelty clause that is more problematic. The theories/models involved
are of course different. For example, one is purely topological, the other is
not. Because of these apparent differences, Bain claims that both theories
are dynamically distinct. But is it enough to have emergence? Indeed the
EFT describes important features of the FQH effect, but who would claim
that this pure topological theory describes more than the qualitative fea-
tures of the dynamics? On the contrary, as we have argued in the preceding
subsection, a more complete effective theory must include kinematic terms
and therefore not be purely topological. Bain goes as far to say that
Dynamical distinctness, coupled with the formal distinction be-
tween the field ψ that encodes the degrees of freedom of the
high-energy theory and the fields aµ, (Aµ + aµ) that encode the
degrees of freedom of the EFT, suggest that the later character-
izes physical systems (i.e., two topological Chern-Simons fields)
that are ontologically distinct from those characterized by the
former (i.e., non-relativistic composite electrons). (Bain p.264
[2013])
This quote is puzzling. What kind of dynamical distinctiveness and formal
distinction are strong enough to be qualified as emergent? In what way is
a formal difference ontologically significative? These questions are however
22Because of the coupling to the external magnetic field, there is more than one Chern-
Simons term.
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unavoidable since too weak of an answer will make emergence ubiquitous.
For example, in many contexts, one can describe electrons with a scalar
field. This is perfectly reasonable if the spin does not play a important role
in the phenomenon under study. Are these cases emergent? They are in
principle formally and dynamically distinct – in the sense that they do not
exhibit the same statistics – from a description of the system that includes
spinors. This is why we included a modality aspect to the novelty clause
of [te]. The new system should not only be distinct but in a certain way
forbidden. The two theories used in Bain’s reconstruction, QED3 and the
pure Chern-Simons theory, do not have this property.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a new account of emergence – “transfor-
mational emergence” – that captures the very hallmarks of the notion in
a diachronic, weakly ontological sense. As such, the proposed account en-
capsulates a perspective shift from the most widespread, hierarchical and
synchronic view according to which “more is different”, to a non-holistic
and dynamical perspective in the light of which “after is different”. As we
have shown, this new way of looking at emergence achieves the tour de force
of being at the same time empirically well-supported and faithful to most of
the emergentist intuitions. Accordingly, [te] turns out to be philosophically
fruitful and scientifically respectful, and should therefore be taken as a new
serious contender in the debates.
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